3b6bb15e86
d9b8fa6098d fix: Fake broadcast address for 127.x.x.x aa649165a57 chore: Add code for future netprof TCP testing 9e5693de5ac chore: add to_string functions for netprof enums 52d915e6a90 cleanup: Heap allocate network profile objects 80fabd4a729 feat: Implement Tox network profiler 05abe083cb6 cleanup: Some random cleanups, mostly related to mem. 5cca24513b8 cleanup: Check that onion IP/Port packing worked. e092ecd1244 cleanup: Use tox memory allocator in some more places. 3cfe41c7587 fix: Avoid `memcpy`-ing structs into onion ping id data. e32ac001938 fix: Add more information on why the frame was not sent. ab887003687 fix: Allow TCP connections to fail `connect` calls. 7603170e663 refactor: Use tox memory in group connection allocations. 5bd8a85eb89 cleanup: Align internal logger with external on type of source line. e9bf524d9e1 cleanup: Add missing `#include` to sort_test.cc. d10c966b998 feat: Add `to_string` functions for toxencryptsave errors. 7bfd0dc8003 docs: Update the docs for group join functions 380dde9f2ae test: Add more logging to TCP connection constructor. 0f12f384c8c cleanup: Reduce stack frame sizes to below 4096 bytes. bc43cec0626 chore: Happy new year! fbe78f1702e cleanup: Add a `TOX_HIDE_DEPRECATED` check to hide deprecated symbols. 44d9da07e77 refactor: Use tox memory for group moderation/pack allocations. 7f26d520168 refactor: Use tox memory in group chats allocations. 2f62f3d0e77 refactor: Use tox Memory for group allocations. 8a968162041 chore: Add dispatch/events headers to bazel export. 2bbfb35abf6 docs: Output the error code string instead of int. in toxav logging d55d0e4eaef cleanup: Remove redundant code for checking if group exists 2a6dc643338 chore: Upgrade dependencies for websockify. fc0650601c1 fix: Allow peers to reconnect to group chats using a password git-subtree-dir: external/toxcore/c-toxcore git-subtree-split: d9b8fa6098de6c074038b6664d2572627540b148
536 lines
18 KiB
C
536 lines
18 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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* Copyright © 2016-2025 The TokTok team.
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* Copyright © 2013 Tox project.
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*/
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#include "crypto_core.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sodium.h>
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#include "attributes.h"
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#include "ccompat.h"
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#include "mem.h"
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#include "util.h"
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static_assert(CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE == crypto_box_MACBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_MACBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE == crypto_box_NONCEBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_NONCEBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE == crypto_auth_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE should be equal to crypto_auth_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_auth_KEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_auth_KEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE == crypto_hash_sha256_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE should be equal to crypto_hash_sha256_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE == crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE should be equal to crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == 32,
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"CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE is required to be 32 bytes for pk_equal to work");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE == crypto_sign_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGN_SECRET_KEY_SIZE == crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGN_SECRET_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES");
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bool create_extended_keypair(Extended_Public_Key *pk, Extended_Secret_Key *sk, const Random *rng)
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{
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/* create signature key pair */
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uint8_t seed[crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES];
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random_bytes(rng, seed, crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES);
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crypto_sign_seed_keypair(pk->sig, sk->sig, seed);
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crypto_memzero(seed, crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES);
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/* convert public signature key to public encryption key */
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const int res1 = crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(pk->enc, pk->sig);
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/* convert secret signature key to secret encryption key */
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const int res2 = crypto_sign_ed25519_sk_to_curve25519(sk->enc, sk->sig);
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return res1 == 0 && res2 == 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_enc_key(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->enc;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_sig_pk(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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void set_sig_pk(Extended_Public_Key *key, const uint8_t *sig_pk)
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{
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memcpy(key->sig, sig_pk, SIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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const uint8_t *get_sig_sk(const Extended_Secret_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_chat_id(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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#if !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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non_null()
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static uint8_t *crypto_malloc(const Memory *mem, size_t bytes)
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{
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uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t *)mem_balloc(mem, bytes);
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if (ptr != nullptr) {
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crypto_memlock(ptr, bytes);
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}
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return ptr;
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}
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non_null(1) nullable(2)
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static void crypto_free(const Memory *mem, uint8_t *ptr, size_t bytes)
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{
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if (ptr != nullptr) {
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crypto_memzero(ptr, bytes);
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crypto_memunlock(ptr, bytes);
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}
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mem_delete(mem, ptr);
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}
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#endif /* !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) */
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void crypto_memzero(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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memzero((uint8_t *)data, length);
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#else
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sodium_memzero(data, length);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_memlock(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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return false;
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#else
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return sodium_mlock(data, length) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_memunlock(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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return false;
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#else
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return sodium_munlock(data, length) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool pk_equal(const uint8_t pk1[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE], const uint8_t pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(pk1, pk2, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_32(pk1, pk2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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void pk_copy(uint8_t dest[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE], const uint8_t src[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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memcpy(dest, src, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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bool crypto_sha512_eq(const uint8_t cksum1[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE], const uint8_t cksum2[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE])
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(cksum1, cksum2, CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_64(cksum1, cksum2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_sha256_eq(const uint8_t cksum1[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE], const uint8_t cksum2[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(cksum1, cksum2, CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_32(cksum1, cksum2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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uint8_t random_u08(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint8_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, &randnum, 1);
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return randnum;
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}
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uint16_t random_u16(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint16_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint32_t random_u32(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint32_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint64_t random_u64(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint64_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint32_t random_range_u32(const Random *rng, uint32_t upper_bound)
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{
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return rng->funcs->random_uniform(rng->obj, upper_bound);
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}
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bool crypto_signature_create(uint8_t signature[CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *message, uint64_t message_length,
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const uint8_t secret_key[SIG_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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return crypto_sign_detached(signature, nullptr, message, message_length, secret_key) == 0;
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}
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bool crypto_signature_verify(const uint8_t signature[CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *message, uint64_t message_length,
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const uint8_t public_key[SIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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return crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, message, message_length, public_key) == 0;
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}
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bool public_key_valid(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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/* Last bit of key is always zero. */
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return public_key[31] < 128;
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}
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int32_t encrypt_precompute(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
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uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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memcpy(shared_key, public_key, CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE);
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return 0;
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#else
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return crypto_box_beforenm(shared_key, public_key, secret_key);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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int32_t encrypt_data_symmetric(const Memory *mem,
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const uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *plain, size_t length, uint8_t *encrypted)
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{
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if (length == 0 || shared_key == nullptr || nonce == nullptr || plain == nullptr || encrypted == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Don't encrypt anything.
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memcpy(encrypted, plain, length);
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// Zero MAC to avoid uninitialized memory reads.
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memzero(encrypted + length, crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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#else
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const size_t size_temp_plain = length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES;
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const size_t size_temp_encrypted = length + crypto_box_MACBYTES + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES;
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uint8_t *temp_plain = crypto_malloc(mem, size_temp_plain);
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uint8_t *temp_encrypted = crypto_malloc(mem, size_temp_encrypted);
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if (temp_plain == nullptr || temp_encrypted == nullptr) {
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// crypto_box_afternm requires the entire range of the output array be
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// initialised with something. It doesn't matter what it's initialised with,
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// so we'll pick 0x00.
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memzero(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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memzero(temp_plain, crypto_box_ZEROBYTES);
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// Pad the message with 32 0 bytes.
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memcpy(temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, plain, length);
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if (crypto_box_afternm(temp_encrypted, temp_plain, length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, nonce,
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shared_key) != 0) {
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// Unpad the encrypted message.
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memcpy(encrypted, temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, length + crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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assert(length < INT32_MAX - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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return (int32_t)(length + crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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}
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int32_t decrypt_data_symmetric(const Memory *mem,
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const uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t length, uint8_t *plain)
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{
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if (length <= crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES || shared_key == nullptr || nonce == nullptr || encrypted == nullptr
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|| plain == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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assert(length >= crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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memcpy(plain, encrypted, length - crypto_box_MACBYTES); // Don't encrypt anything
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#else
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const size_t size_temp_plain = length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES;
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const size_t size_temp_encrypted = length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES;
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uint8_t *temp_plain = crypto_malloc(mem, size_temp_plain);
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uint8_t *temp_encrypted = crypto_malloc(mem, size_temp_encrypted);
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if (temp_plain == nullptr || temp_encrypted == nullptr) {
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// crypto_box_open_afternm requires the entire range of the output array be
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// initialised with something. It doesn't matter what it's initialised with,
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// so we'll pick 0x00.
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memzero(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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memzero(temp_encrypted, crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
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// Pad the message with 16 0 bytes.
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memcpy(temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, encrypted, length);
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if (crypto_box_open_afternm(temp_plain, temp_encrypted, length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, nonce,
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shared_key) != 0) {
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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memcpy(plain, temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, length - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(mem, temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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assert(length > crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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assert(length < INT32_MAX);
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return (int32_t)(length - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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}
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int32_t encrypt_data(const Memory *mem,
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const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *plain, size_t length, uint8_t *encrypted)
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{
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if (public_key == nullptr || secret_key == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
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encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
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const int ret = encrypt_data_symmetric(mem, k, nonce, plain, length, encrypted);
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crypto_memzero(k, sizeof(k));
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return ret;
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}
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int32_t decrypt_data(const Memory *mem,
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const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t length, uint8_t *plain)
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{
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if (public_key == nullptr || secret_key == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
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encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
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const int ret = decrypt_data_symmetric(mem, k, nonce, encrypted, length, plain);
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crypto_memzero(k, sizeof(k));
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return ret;
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}
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void increment_nonce(uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE])
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{
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/* TODO(irungentoo): use `increment_nonce_number(nonce, 1)` or
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* sodium_increment (change to little endian).
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*
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* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop.
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* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
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* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
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* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
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*/
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uint_fast16_t carry = 1U;
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for (uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES; i != 0; --i) {
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carry += (uint_fast16_t)nonce[i - 1];
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nonce[i - 1] = (uint8_t)carry;
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carry >>= 8;
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}
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}
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void increment_nonce_number(uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE], uint32_t increment)
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{
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/* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop
|
|
* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
|
|
* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
|
|
* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
|
|
*/
|
|
uint8_t num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES] = {0};
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 4] = increment >> 24;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 3] = increment >> 16;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 2] = increment >> 8;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 1] = increment;
|
|
|
|
uint_fast16_t carry = 0U;
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES; i != 0; --i) {
|
|
carry += (uint_fast16_t)nonce[i - 1] + (uint_fast16_t)num_as_nonce[i - 1];
|
|
nonce[i - 1] = (uint8_t)carry;
|
|
carry >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void random_nonce(const Random *rng, uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, nonce, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void new_symmetric_key(const Random *rng, uint8_t key[CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, key, CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int32_t crypto_new_keypair(const Random *rng,
|
|
uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, secret_key, CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
memzero(public_key, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE); // Make MSAN happy
|
|
crypto_derive_public_key(public_key, secret_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_derive_public_key(uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_base(public_key, secret_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void new_hmac_key(const Random *rng, uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, key, CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_hmac(uint8_t auth[CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE], const uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memcpy(auth, key, 16);
|
|
memcpy(auth + 16, data, length < 16 ? length : 16);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_auth(auth, data, length, key);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool crypto_hmac_verify(const uint8_t auth[CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE], const uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
return memcmp(auth, key, 16) == 0 && memcmp(auth + 16, data, length < 16 ? length : 16) == 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
return crypto_auth_verify(auth, data, length, key) == 0;
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_sha256(uint8_t hash[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE], const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memzero(hash, CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(hash, data, length < CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE ? length : CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_hash_sha256(hash, data, length);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_sha512(uint8_t hash[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE], const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memzero(hash, CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(hash, data, length < CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE ? length : CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, data, length);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
non_null()
|
|
static void sys_random_bytes(void *obj, uint8_t *bytes, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
randombytes(bytes, length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
non_null()
|
|
static uint32_t sys_random_uniform(void *obj, uint32_t upper_bound)
|
|
{
|
|
return randombytes_uniform(upper_bound);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const Random_Funcs os_random_funcs = {
|
|
sys_random_bytes,
|
|
sys_random_uniform,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const Random os_random_obj = {&os_random_funcs};
|
|
|
|
const Random *os_random(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
if ((true)) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
// It is safe to call this function more than once and from different
|
|
// threads -- subsequent calls won't have any effects.
|
|
if (sodium_init() == -1) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
return &os_random_obj;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void random_bytes(const Random *rng, uint8_t *bytes, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
rng->funcs->random_bytes(rng->obj, bytes, length);
|
|
}
|