Green Sky
aae086cc65
b03b571272 fix: flaky tcp test This only fixes the symptoms, not the real problem. Sometimes or consistently on some platforms a socket might need a moment before it can be written to. 32e67ab4c2 cleanup: use typedef for private message ID's in callback 7b1db6adc1 feat: add message IDs to private group messages 99e0bcc27d refactor: Observers/ignored peers can now send and receive custom packets b3c3c49d26 fix: Disable IPv6 in Windows cross-compilation tests e742deddff feat: Check hashes of Windows dependencies when cross-compiling dfb9a0b02b fix: Test the current Windows Dockerfile, not an old Dockerhub image 14de93ccec chore: Use WineHQ's Wine as Debian Bookworm's crashes ed37616249 docs: Update the Windows cross-compilation section 9bb79c174f cleanup: Remove a couple of unnecessary misc_tools dependencies 19475adb70 chore: Statically link OpenMP into the cracker fun util on Windows 1be311e51f feat: Build the fun utils when cross-compiling to Windows 88133f8446 chore: Strip Windows binaries 3cc0ae7535 refactor: Copy over all of the required static dependencies c4fa8f7fb1 feat: Generate .def, .exp and .lib files when building for Windows 74bbac5363 feat: Let CMake create the dll instead of doing so ourselves 246642e9ae feat: Harden Windows cross-compilation 8d431c0d11 chore: Bump Windows build dependency versions e519f7998b fix: Remove unnecessary wsock32 dependency on Windows ed2b60c217 chore: Use a specific non-broken slimcc version. d7f21010a1 chore: Update github actions. e71a68b7f2 docs: Update the list of CMake options 77e08876ff chore: Remove mod and founder from group API naming scheme 12bc042767 docs: add the experimental api build option to INSTALL.md e1fa5cae96 refactor: Rename Queries to Query to align with other enums. be82a3ea30 fix: Correct type for conference offline peer numbers. 0627c36716 test: Add pkgsrc build. 92578afe4b test: Add FreeBSD VM action on GitHub. 52ece0f57b test: Build toxcore on NetBSD (VM). 3fe8ee2c11 chore: Only install tox_private.h on request. 9a8dfa06ab fix: save_compatibility_test failing on big-endian systems 86f5e55578 fix: Don't serve files from websockify. 710eb674a5 fix: Correctly pass extended public keys to group moderation code. 021db7031c refactor: Use `struct`s for extended public/secret keys. a1e999fd80 chore: Compile libsodium reference implementation with compcert. fbe3c19cf5 cleanup: correct a few nullable annotations 623e3ee5c3 cleanup: Don't use `memcpy` to cast arbitrary `struct`s to `uint8_t[]`. c71567dc18 fix: Pass array, not array pointer, to `memcmp`. 9b46a08144 cleanup: Never pass `void*` directly to `memcpy`. 5d7b7a7bbc refactor: Use tox rng to seed the keypair generation. 961891d568 cleanup: Small improvements found by PVS Studio. 8201019f0d chore: Disable NGC saving by default, enable through Tox_Options. 5dd9ee3f65 cleanup: Replace pointer arithmetic with explicit `&arr[i]`. ca4606d49d refactor: Use strong typedef for NGC peer id. 442213b722 cleanup: Simplify custom packet length check in NGC. 08d3393def fix: Correct a few potential null derefs in bootstrap daemon. b9877b32b0 fix: Add missing memunlock of local variable when it goes out of scope. dab5fe44b9 fix: Zero out stack-allocated secret key before return. f058103299 refactor: Make prune_gc_sanctions_list more obviously correct. 3ba7a0dec9 docs: Add static analysis tool list to README. 8d0811a0f3 docs: Run prettier-markdown on markdown files. 969e3a2bfc refactor: Fix network test not using the strong typedef 93c83fbc7c refactor: Use strong typedef instead of struct for `Socket`. 9fe18b176f fix: Fix some false positive from PVS Studio. 7c44379ccb cleanup: Check that WINXP macro exists before comparing it. 5c93231bef refactor: Make tox mutex non-recursive. aacff73939 docs: Fix up doxyfile. d55fc85ff5 docs: Add more documentation to crypto_core. 5bdaaaedb6 refactor: Remove `Tox *` from `tox_dispatch`. e202341e76 refactor: Don't rely on tox_dispatch passing tox in tests. 34df938f52 chore: Use C++ mode for clang-tidy. 8b05296a78 chore: Check that both gtest and gmock exist for tests. 42010660e1 test: Add slimcc compiler compatibility test. b473630321 chore: Add some comments to the astyle config. b7404f24f6 cleanup: Remove implicit bool conversions. 4e2dba4d9f chore: Reformat sources with astyle. 4359e3a6bc chore: Rename C++ headers to .hh suffixes. 0c05566e58 cleanup: Further `#include` cleanups. 8d29935b7a chore: Only check the bootstrap daemon checksum on release. f70e588bc6 cleanup: Add more `const` where possible. 511bfe39c8 cleanup: Use Bazel modules to enforce proper `#include` hygiene. 1710a0d091 refactor: Move pack/unpack `IP_Port` from DHT into network module. a975943564 chore: Really fix coverage docker image build. c08409390f chore: Fix post-submit coverage image. 39aadf8922 fix: Don't use `memcmp` to compare `IP_Port`s. d94246a906 fix: partially fix a bug that prevented group part messages from sending. eeaa039222 chore: Fix rpm build; add a CI check for it. 8328449c1a chore: Speed up docker builds a bit by reducing layer count. d6d67d56f3 cleanup: Add `const` where possible in auto tests. 6aa9e6850d cleanup: Minor cleanup of event unpack code. bdf460a3a9 refactor: Rename `system_{memory,...}` to `os_{memory,...}`. 203e1af81e fix: a few off by one errors in group autotests 5c093c4888 cleanup: Remove all uses of `SIZEOF_VLA`. 662c2140f3 test: Add goblint static analyser. 8f07755834 cleanup: Use `memzero(x, s)` instead of `memset(x, 0, s)`. a7258e40cf cleanup: Use explicit 0 instead of `PACKET_ID_PADDING`. 6370d0f15d cleanup: Expand the `Tox_Options` accessor macros. 14a1a0b9bd cleanup: Remove plan9 support. a05dccad13 test: Add a simple new/delete test for Tox. 1cdcf938b9 cleanup: Add comment after every `#endif`. ba99d4dc4b test: Fix comment I broke in the events test PR. e07248debb refactor: Migrate auto_tests to new events API. bdd42b5452 refactor: Add common msgpack array packer with callback. 3c659f5288 cleanup: Rename group to conference in groupav documentation. 89957be230 cleanup: Ensure handler params are named after callback params. c650d9d345 refactor: Pass `this` pointer as first param to s11n callbacks. e7fb91ddb8 refactor: Allow NULL pointers for byte arrays in events. 5e2c8cabc1 cleanup: make some improvements to group moderation test 259de4867e cleanup: Remove `bin_pack_{new,free}`. 21a8ff5895 cleanup: skip a do_gc iteration before removing peers marked for deletion 16809dc36e feat: Add dht_get_nodes_response event to the events system. git-subtree-dir: external/toxcore/c-toxcore git-subtree-split: b03b5712720de9a9901ea12fd741f177327a7021
531 lines
18 KiB
C
531 lines
18 KiB
C
/* SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-3.0-or-later
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* Copyright © 2016-2024 The TokTok team.
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* Copyright © 2013 Tox project.
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*/
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#include "crypto_core.h"
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#include <assert.h>
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <sodium.h>
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#include "attributes.h"
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#include "ccompat.h"
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#include "util.h"
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static_assert(CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_PUBLICKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_SECRETKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE == crypto_box_MACBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_MAC_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_MACBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE == crypto_box_NONCEBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE should be equal to crypto_box_NONCEBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE == crypto_auth_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE should be equal to crypto_auth_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_auth_KEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_auth_KEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE == crypto_hash_sha256_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE should be equal to crypto_hash_sha256_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE == crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE should be equal to crypto_hash_sha512_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == 32,
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"CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE is required to be 32 bytes for pk_equal to work");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE == crypto_sign_BYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_BYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE == crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGN_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_PUBLICKEYBYTES");
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static_assert(CRYPTO_SIGN_SECRET_KEY_SIZE == crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES,
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"CRYPTO_SIGN_SECRET_KEY_SIZE should be equal to crypto_sign_SECRETKEYBYTES");
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bool create_extended_keypair(Extended_Public_Key *pk, Extended_Secret_Key *sk, const Random *rng)
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{
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/* create signature key pair */
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uint8_t seed[crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES];
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random_bytes(rng, seed, crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES);
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crypto_sign_seed_keypair(pk->sig, sk->sig, seed);
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crypto_memzero(seed, crypto_sign_SEEDBYTES);
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/* convert public signature key to public encryption key */
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const int res1 = crypto_sign_ed25519_pk_to_curve25519(pk->enc, pk->sig);
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/* convert secret signature key to secret encryption key */
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const int res2 = crypto_sign_ed25519_sk_to_curve25519(sk->enc, sk->sig);
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return res1 == 0 && res2 == 0;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_enc_key(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->enc;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_sig_pk(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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void set_sig_pk(Extended_Public_Key *key, const uint8_t *sig_pk)
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{
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memcpy(key->sig, sig_pk, SIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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const uint8_t *get_sig_sk(const Extended_Secret_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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const uint8_t *get_chat_id(const Extended_Public_Key *key)
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{
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return key->sig;
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}
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#if !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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static uint8_t *crypto_malloc(size_t bytes)
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{
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uint8_t *ptr = (uint8_t *)malloc(bytes);
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if (ptr != nullptr) {
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crypto_memlock(ptr, bytes);
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}
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return ptr;
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}
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nullable(1)
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static void crypto_free(uint8_t *ptr, size_t bytes)
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{
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if (ptr != nullptr) {
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crypto_memzero(ptr, bytes);
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crypto_memunlock(ptr, bytes);
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}
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free(ptr);
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}
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#endif /* !defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION) */
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void crypto_memzero(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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memzero((uint8_t *)data, length);
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#else
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sodium_memzero(data, length);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_memlock(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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return false;
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#else
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return sodium_mlock(data, length) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_memunlock(void *data, size_t length)
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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return false;
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#else
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return sodium_munlock(data, length) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool pk_equal(const uint8_t pk1[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE], const uint8_t pk2[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(pk1, pk2, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_32(pk1, pk2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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void pk_copy(uint8_t dest[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE], const uint8_t src[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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memcpy(dest, src, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE);
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}
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bool crypto_sha512_eq(const uint8_t cksum1[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE], const uint8_t cksum2[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE])
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{
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#if defined(FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION)
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(cksum1, cksum2, CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_64(cksum1, cksum2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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bool crypto_sha256_eq(const uint8_t cksum1[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE], const uint8_t cksum2[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Hope that this is better for the fuzzer
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return memcmp(cksum1, cksum2, CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE) == 0;
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#else
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return crypto_verify_32(cksum1, cksum2) == 0;
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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uint8_t random_u08(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint8_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, &randnum, 1);
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return randnum;
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}
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uint16_t random_u16(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint16_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint32_t random_u32(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint32_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint64_t random_u64(const Random *rng)
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{
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uint64_t randnum;
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random_bytes(rng, (uint8_t *)&randnum, sizeof(randnum));
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return randnum;
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}
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uint32_t random_range_u32(const Random *rng, uint32_t upper_bound)
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{
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return rng->funcs->random_uniform(rng->obj, upper_bound);
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}
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bool crypto_signature_create(uint8_t signature[CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *message, uint64_t message_length,
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const uint8_t secret_key[SIG_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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return crypto_sign_detached(signature, nullptr, message, message_length, secret_key) == 0;
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}
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bool crypto_signature_verify(const uint8_t signature[CRYPTO_SIGNATURE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *message, uint64_t message_length,
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const uint8_t public_key[SIG_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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return crypto_sign_verify_detached(signature, message, message_length, public_key) == 0;
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}
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bool public_key_valid(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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/* Last bit of key is always zero. */
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return public_key[31] < 128;
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}
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int32_t encrypt_precompute(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
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uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE])
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{
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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memcpy(shared_key, public_key, CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE);
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return 0;
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#else
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return crypto_box_beforenm(shared_key, public_key, secret_key);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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}
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int32_t encrypt_data_symmetric(const uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *plain, size_t length, uint8_t *encrypted)
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{
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if (length == 0 || shared_key == nullptr || nonce == nullptr || plain == nullptr || encrypted == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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// Don't encrypt anything.
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memcpy(encrypted, plain, length);
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// Zero MAC to avoid uninitialized memory reads.
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memzero(encrypted + length, crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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#else
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const size_t size_temp_plain = length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES;
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const size_t size_temp_encrypted = length + crypto_box_MACBYTES + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES;
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uint8_t *temp_plain = crypto_malloc(size_temp_plain);
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uint8_t *temp_encrypted = crypto_malloc(size_temp_encrypted);
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if (temp_plain == nullptr || temp_encrypted == nullptr) {
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crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// crypto_box_afternm requires the entire range of the output array be
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// initialised with something. It doesn't matter what it's initialised with,
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// so we'll pick 0x00.
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memzero(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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memzero(temp_plain, crypto_box_ZEROBYTES);
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// Pad the message with 32 0 bytes.
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memcpy(temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, plain, length);
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if (crypto_box_afternm(temp_encrypted, temp_plain, length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, nonce,
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shared_key) != 0) {
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crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// Unpad the encrypted message.
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memcpy(encrypted, temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, length + crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
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assert(length < INT32_MAX - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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return (int32_t)(length + crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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}
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int32_t decrypt_data_symmetric(const uint8_t shared_key[CRYPTO_SHARED_KEY_SIZE],
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const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
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const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t length, uint8_t *plain)
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{
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if (length <= crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES || shared_key == nullptr || nonce == nullptr || encrypted == nullptr
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|| plain == nullptr) {
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return -1;
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}
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#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
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assert(length >= crypto_box_MACBYTES);
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memcpy(plain, encrypted, length - crypto_box_MACBYTES); // Don't encrypt anything
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#else
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const size_t size_temp_plain = length + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES;
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const size_t size_temp_encrypted = length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES;
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uint8_t *temp_plain = crypto_malloc(size_temp_plain);
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uint8_t *temp_encrypted = crypto_malloc(size_temp_encrypted);
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if (temp_plain == nullptr || temp_encrypted == nullptr) {
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crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
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return -1;
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}
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// crypto_box_open_afternm requires the entire range of the output array be
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// initialised with something. It doesn't matter what it's initialised with,
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// so we'll pick 0x00.
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memzero(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
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memzero(temp_encrypted, crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES);
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// Pad the message with 16 0 bytes.
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memcpy(temp_encrypted + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, encrypted, length);
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if (crypto_box_open_afternm(temp_plain, temp_encrypted, length + crypto_box_BOXZEROBYTES, nonce,
|
|
shared_key) != 0) {
|
|
crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
|
|
crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
memcpy(plain, temp_plain + crypto_box_ZEROBYTES, length - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
|
|
|
|
crypto_free(temp_plain, size_temp_plain);
|
|
crypto_free(temp_encrypted, size_temp_encrypted);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
assert(length > crypto_box_MACBYTES);
|
|
assert(length < INT32_MAX);
|
|
return (int32_t)(length - crypto_box_MACBYTES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int32_t encrypt_data(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *plain, size_t length, uint8_t *encrypted)
|
|
{
|
|
if (public_key == nullptr || secret_key == nullptr) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
|
|
encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
|
|
const int ret = encrypt_data_symmetric(k, nonce, plain, length, encrypted);
|
|
crypto_memzero(k, sizeof(k));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int32_t decrypt_data(const uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *encrypted, size_t length, uint8_t *plain)
|
|
{
|
|
if (public_key == nullptr || secret_key == nullptr) {
|
|
return -1;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
uint8_t k[crypto_box_BEFORENMBYTES];
|
|
encrypt_precompute(public_key, secret_key, k);
|
|
const int ret = decrypt_data_symmetric(k, nonce, encrypted, length, plain);
|
|
crypto_memzero(k, sizeof(k));
|
|
return ret;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void increment_nonce(uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
/* TODO(irungentoo): use `increment_nonce_number(nonce, 1)` or
|
|
* sodium_increment (change to little endian).
|
|
*
|
|
* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop.
|
|
* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
|
|
* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
|
|
* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
|
|
*/
|
|
uint_fast16_t carry = 1U;
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES; i != 0; --i) {
|
|
carry += (uint_fast16_t)nonce[i - 1];
|
|
nonce[i - 1] = (uint8_t)carry;
|
|
carry >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void increment_nonce_number(uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE], uint32_t increment)
|
|
{
|
|
/* NOTE don't use breaks inside this loop
|
|
* In particular, make sure, as far as possible,
|
|
* that loop bounds and their potential underflow or overflow
|
|
* are independent of user-controlled input (you may have heard of the Heartbleed bug).
|
|
*/
|
|
uint8_t num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES] = {0};
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 4] = increment >> 24;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 3] = increment >> 16;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 2] = increment >> 8;
|
|
num_as_nonce[crypto_box_NONCEBYTES - 1] = increment;
|
|
|
|
uint_fast16_t carry = 0U;
|
|
|
|
for (uint32_t i = crypto_box_NONCEBYTES; i != 0; --i) {
|
|
carry += (uint_fast16_t)nonce[i - 1] + (uint_fast16_t)num_as_nonce[i - 1];
|
|
nonce[i - 1] = (uint8_t)carry;
|
|
carry >>= 8;
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void random_nonce(const Random *rng, uint8_t nonce[CRYPTO_NONCE_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, nonce, crypto_box_NONCEBYTES);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void new_symmetric_key(const Random *rng, uint8_t key[CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, key, CRYPTO_SYMMETRIC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
int32_t crypto_new_keypair(const Random *rng,
|
|
uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, secret_key, CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
memzero(public_key, CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE); // Make MSAN happy
|
|
crypto_derive_public_key(public_key, secret_key);
|
|
return 0;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_derive_public_key(uint8_t public_key[CRYPTO_PUBLIC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t secret_key[CRYPTO_SECRET_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
crypto_scalarmult_curve25519_base(public_key, secret_key);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void new_hmac_key(const Random *rng, uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE])
|
|
{
|
|
random_bytes(rng, key, CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_hmac(uint8_t auth[CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE], const uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memcpy(auth, key, 16);
|
|
memcpy(auth + 16, data, length < 16 ? length : 16);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_auth(auth, data, length, key);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
bool crypto_hmac_verify(const uint8_t auth[CRYPTO_HMAC_SIZE], const uint8_t key[CRYPTO_HMAC_KEY_SIZE],
|
|
const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
return memcmp(auth, key, 16) == 0 && memcmp(auth + 16, data, length < 16 ? length : 16) == 0;
|
|
#else
|
|
return crypto_auth_verify(auth, data, length, key) == 0;
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_sha256(uint8_t hash[CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE], const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memzero(hash, CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(hash, data, length < CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE ? length : CRYPTO_SHA256_SIZE);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_hash_sha256(hash, data, length);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void crypto_sha512(uint8_t hash[CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE], const uint8_t *data, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
memzero(hash, CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE);
|
|
memcpy(hash, data, length < CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE ? length : CRYPTO_SHA512_SIZE);
|
|
#else
|
|
crypto_hash_sha512(hash, data, length);
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
non_null()
|
|
static void sys_random_bytes(void *obj, uint8_t *bytes, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
randombytes(bytes, length);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
non_null()
|
|
static uint32_t sys_random_uniform(void *obj, uint32_t upper_bound)
|
|
{
|
|
return randombytes_uniform(upper_bound);
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
static const Random_Funcs os_random_funcs = {
|
|
sys_random_bytes,
|
|
sys_random_uniform,
|
|
};
|
|
|
|
static const Random os_random_obj = {&os_random_funcs};
|
|
|
|
const Random *os_random(void)
|
|
{
|
|
#ifdef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
|
|
if ((true)) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
#endif /* FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION */
|
|
// It is safe to call this function more than once and from different
|
|
// threads -- subsequent calls won't have any effects.
|
|
if (sodium_init() == -1) {
|
|
return nullptr;
|
|
}
|
|
return &os_random_obj;
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
void random_bytes(const Random *rng, uint8_t *bytes, size_t length)
|
|
{
|
|
rng->funcs->random_bytes(rng->obj, bytes, length);
|
|
}
|