diff --git a/AddingAnOnionService.md b/AddingAnOnionService.md
index 050001b..a9eddb9 100644
--- a/AddingAnOnionService.md
+++ b/AddingAnOnionService.md
@@ -136,3 +136,4 @@ Details:
 * https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/setup/
 * https://community.torproject.org/onion-services/
 * https://www.wired.com/story/tor-browser-russia-blocks/
+* https://nusenu.medium.com/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-exploiting-users-in-2020-part-i-1097575c0cac
diff --git a/ToxAndTorInChinaAndIran.md b/ToxAndTorInChinaAndIran.md
index 81d14ec..e29487a 100644
--- a/ToxAndTorInChinaAndIran.md
+++ b/ToxAndTorInChinaAndIran.md
@@ -15,14 +15,14 @@ traffic look like another protocol like HTTP or whatever:
 
 So the best way to handle this may be to improve the documentation in
 Tox clients of how to use Tor.  Whether or not you trust Tor 
-(you can't trust exit nodes 40% of the time) it is the only thing
-that works right now in e.g. Egypt or Iran. And people can test the Tor
-setup with their brower (or TorBrowser) to make sure they are working 
-before they try Tox over Tor.
+(you [can't trust exit nodes >25% of the time](https://nusenu.medium.com/how-malicious-tor-relays-are-exploiting-users-in-2020-part-i-1097575c0cac))
+ it is the only thing that works right now in e.g. Egypt or Iran.
+And people can test the Tor setup with their brower (or TorBrowser) 
+to make sure they are working before they try Tox over Tor.
 
 The only way of getting a lot of resilience "cheaply" is to encourage
- bootstrap node operators to also run a Tor client to serve the node
- over Onionv3. This is the only way I can see dealing with the fact
+bootstrap node operators to also run a Tor client to serve the node
+over Onionv3. This is the only way I can see dealing with the fact
 that Tox is a network of so few bootstrap nodes. If the Tox nodebase was
 improved to serve BS nodes, and OnionV3 relays, it would be much more
 resilient. I'm assuming the adversaries cannot block .onion addresses